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William Oliver Martin published  "The Order and Integration of Knowledge" in 1957 to address  the 
problem of the nature and the order of various kinds of knowledge; in particular, the theoretical problem of 
how one kind of knowledge is related to another kind. Martin characterizes kinds of knowledge as being 
either autonomous or synthetic. The latter are reducible to two or more of the autonomous (or irreducible) 
kinds of knowledge, viz., history (H), metaphysics (Meta), theology (T), formal logic (FL), mathematics 
(Math), and generalizations of experimental science (G). Metaphysics and theology constitute the two 
domains of the ontological context while history and experimental science are the two domains of the 
phenomenological context. The relation of one kind of knowledge to another may be instrumental, 
constitutive, and/or regulative. For instance, historical propositions are constitutive of G, metaphysical 
propositions are regulative of G, and propositions in formal logic and mathematics are instrumental to G. 
Theological propositions are not related to G and so there is no conflict between science and theology. 
Martin's work sheds light on the possible areas of incompatibility between science and religion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Preamble 
The finite nature of the human mind is evident by the need to understand reality by a process of analysis.  
This process of taking things apart has resulted in a multitude of disciplines as manifested in the 
existence of many departments in our institutions of higher learning.  It is clear that each autonomous 
kind of knowledge deals primarily with a certain aspect of reality and as such it is based on a specific 
type of evidence that are used to establish the truth or falsehood of given propositions in that field.  For 
instance, it is foolish for a scientist to require the same kind of evidence, which is appropriate to establish 
truthful statements in the experimental sciences, from a theologian who studies the intrinsic nature of 
God and how He interacts with His creation. The theologian has his own source of evidentiary data that 
differs from that of the scientist. It is important to remark that the data used in all kinds of knowledge is 
made up of unique historical events represented by historical propositions that are based on sensations, 
perceptions, memories, and extant records of past events.  Therefore, human reasoning, using essentially 
historical data stored in the brain, produces human knowledge and understanding.  It is interesting that 
C. S. Lewis indicates, "The rational and moral element in each human mind is a point of force from the 
Supernatural working its way into Nature."1 Therefore, human reasoning is not entirely interlocked with 
the physical aspect of Nature. This is equivalent to the statement of René Descartes that "matter cannot 
think."2  
 
Autonomous and Synthetic Kinds of Knowledge 
What are the basic, autonomous kinds of knowledge needed to analyze and comprehend the whole of 
reality?   Martin3 considers as autonomous the following kinds of knowledge, history (H), metaphysics 
(Meta), theology (T), formal logic (FL), mathematics (Math), and generalizations of experimental science 
(G). Metaphysics and theology constitute the two domains of the ontological context and the others, viz., 
H, FL, Math, and G, as positive kinds of knowledge. History and experimental science are the two 
domains of the phenomenological context whereas formal logic is the domain of intentional context and 
mathematics that of formal context.  In addition, Martin3 considers synthetic kinds of knowledge those 
that result from the integration of a positive kind of knowledge with the ontological (metaphysics and/or 
theology). For instance, the human-social sciences, notably, anthropology, culturology, economics, 
philology, psychology, and sociology are all examples of synthetic kinds of knowledge that integrates 
scientific studies with the humanities, which fundamentally deals with the nature of humans as deduced 
from history. Similarly, the philosophy of history, of mathematics, of science, or of Nature, which are 
synthetic kinds of knowledge, the mode or aspect studied is integrated with the mode of existence or 
being, which is the subject matter of metaphysics and theology. Note that incompatibilities in the 
synthetic kinds of knowledge are reducible to those among the autonomous kinds of knowledge that 
constitutes them. In a sense, Martin systemized the epistemology and metaphysics of Jacques Maritain4 
who dealt with the intrinsic diversity and nature of knowledge that is rational and speculative, 
philosophical and scientific.   
"Now, whenever a science is considered from the standpoint of the mode studied, and not from the 
standpoint of the being that the mode is of, then that science is considered in its positive sense.  A positive 
science is one which is defined in abstraction from the metaphysical because it is concerned with a mode 
qua mode and not with a mode of being.  Experimental science is positive in this sense.  This does not 
mean that it is anti-metaphysical; it is simply non-metaphysical.  What is anti-metaphysical is positivism, 
which is the position that knowledge is limited to a 'mode,' and that there can be no knowledge of a 
'mode of being' because there is no science of being qua being.  Experimental science is positive science, 
but it is not the same as positivism.  Positivism is a doctrine about it, and hence is not of it.  A proposition 
about experimental science is not necessarily a proposition of it."5 Therefore, one must distinguish 
between the causes supposed in the model descriptions of different aspects of reality and the actual 
causes. The former may be described as secondary while the latter as primary, e.g., God being the 
primary cause as proposed by Nicolas Malebranche.6 This may suggest an understanding of René 
Descartes' notions of "universal and primary cause" and "secondary and particular causes."7 God is the 
primary cause of the actual, moment-by-moment temporal development of all that is; whereas, the 
secondary causes are those that we ascribe to the models that we construct of all that there is, which are 
based on our sensations, perceptions and memories.  Our understanding of Descartes' primary causes is 
in agreement with the "occasionalism" of Malebranche and is contrary to the view of Tad Schmaltz who 
considers creatures rather than God as the casual source of natural change rather than merely "occasional 
causes."8 
 
Nature of Human Knowledge 
Knowledge is summarized in propositions. For instance, historical propositions refer to that which is 
factually known (potentially or actually) of the process of historical events both human and natural past 
events. Historical propositions are instrumental in a general sense to propositions of metaphysics, formal 
logic, and mathematics.9  Scientific laws of Nature are generalization of historical propositions, 
experimental science G, where the data expressed in historical propositions can be obtained, in principle, 
by purely physical devices.10 Therefore, history H in the form of historical propositions is wholly 
constitutive of experimental science G.  The subject matter of formal logic (FL) and mathematics (Math) 
are the nonphysical, mental or mathematical constructs of the "real things," which are based on data 
detected by human senses and/or purely physical devices. Human rationality develops formal logic and 
creates mathematics to summarize data into laws of Nature that lead to theoretical models covering a 
wide range of phenomena. However, scientists deal with secondary causes. First causes involve 
metaphysical (ontological) questions, which regulate science. Without the ontological, neither the 
generalizations nor the historical propositions of the experimental sciences would be possible. The 
integration of all the positive sciences with the ontological gives us the "real thing" that actually exists. 
Metaphysics and theology, the fields that encompass the knowledge of being, constitute the two domains 
of the ontological context that deal with the mode or aspect including the existence or being of the "real 
thing."  There is a nested sequence of mental abstractions and constructions in the human mind 
organizing and making sense of the reality based on physical data obtained by purely physical devices 
and data obtained by humans as "living detectors" of the physical, nonphysical, and the supernatural 
aspects of Nature.11  
 
 
Relations between Autonomous Kinds of Knowledge 
In Table 1, the relations between the different autonomous or irreducible kinds of knowledge are 
specified12 in terms of, "constitutive of" (Con), "instrumental to" (Inst), and "regulative of" (Reg).  For 
instance, metaphysics (Meta) is regulative of all the different kinds of knowledge, except theology (T) 
where metaphysics (Meta) is constitutive of some theological propositions. The latter means that some 
theological proposition t1 implies a particular metaphysical proposition m1, viz., "If t1, then  m1."  The 
converse, "If m1, then t1," does not follow since otherwise the theological proposition t1 is constitutive of 
the metaphysical proposition m1 and so the truth of t1 would be necessary for the truth of m1. The 
constitutive aspect of historical propositions for the generalizations of experimental sciences (G) means 
that given the set of historical propositions {hi}, (i = 1, 2, …., n) and the generalization of them by g1, one 
has that g1  (h1, h2, …., hn).  Therefore, the set {hi} is wholly constitutive of g1.  The induction or 
inference, if (h1, h2, …., hn)  (probably) g1, is the modus operandi of the experimental sciences where 
probability theory is used to indicate which of a given set of generalizations {g1, g2, …} is most likely to be 
true in the light of the data and any other evidence at hand.13   
Mathematical propositions are instrumental in discovering and summarizing the generalizations, which 
are constituted by the historical propositions.  Therefore, the generalization g1, sometimes codified in a 
theoretical model, gives rise to predictions, say, g1 → hp.  If hp is false, then g1 is also false and so the 
generalization or underlying theory is falsified. "Facts (historical propositions) are as relevant to 
metaphysics as to experimental science, but not in the same way; for they are instrumental to the 
discovery of metaphysical truth, but are constitutive as evidence of the generalizations of experimental 
science."14  
 
TABLE 1 
Relations between autonomous kinds of knowledge* 
 H Meta T FL Math G 
H X Inst Con of 
Some 
Inst Inst Con 
Meta Reg X Con of 
Some 
Reg Reg  Reg 
T None None X None None None 
FL Inst Inst Inst X Inst Inst 
Math Inst Inst Inst Inst X Inst 
G Con of 
Some 
Inst Inst Inst Inst X 
*The order of knowledge of  historical propositions (H), metaphysical propositions (Meta), theological 
propositions (T), formal logic propositions (FL), mathematical propositions (Math), and the 
generalizations of experimental science (G) together with their interrelationships described by 
"instrumental to" (Inst), "regulative of " (Reg), and "constitutive of "(Con).   
The analysis of elements of reality into its different aspects, viz. physical, nonphysical, or supernatural, 
gives rise to the different kinds of knowledge needed to give a true description and understanding of that 
which is detectable by purely physical devices and by humans as "detectors."11 The integration of all 
kinds of knowledge is the object of metaphysics, which delimits the possible and is regulative of all the 
positive kinds of knowledge, viz., H, FL, Math, and G, and is partially constitutive of T (See Table 1).  
Historical propositions dealing with the physical aspect of Nature are constitutive of the generalizations 
of experimental science and form the basis for unadulterated science and the discovery of the laws of 
Nature. These generalizations of physical data into laws, say (g1, g2, ..., g10), in turn imply a minimal 
metaphysics m1, dictated by some sort of Ockham’s razor, which forms a foundation of our 
understanding of the physical aspect of Nature. Symbolically, one has (g1, g2, … g10)  →  m1, where 
metaphysics m1 deals merely with the physical aspect of Nature.  Edwin Thompson Jaynes has written 
extensively on probability theory as the logic of science.13  
 
Scientific and Theological Metaphysics 
An example of an implied scientific metaphysics m1 is the principle that Nature can be understood 
(hypothesis of comprehensibility) and exclusion of or dispensing with the cognizing subject 
(objectivation).15  It is clear that any metaphysics m2, which contains metaphysics m1 as a subset, is equally 
compatible with the generalizations (g1, g2, ..., g10).  The stronger constitutive relation of metaphysics to 
some theologies means that given theology t1, then metaphysics m3 must be true, viz., t1 → m3. Theology 
and metaphysics constitute the two domains of the ontological context of the whole of reality, i.e., the 
physical, nonphysical and supernatural aspects of Nature.11 Since experimental science (G) is concerned 
only with the physical aspect of Nature, a possible incompatibility between experimental science and 
theology, if any, would be in the physical aspect only. Metaphysics m1 cannot contain metaphysics m3 as 
a subset since the subject matter of metaphysics m1 is the domain of the phenomenological context and 
thus regulative of only the purely physical. Therefore, a theistic worldview would be based on the 
metaphysics m4, which is the union of m1 and m3, that is, m4 = m1   m3.  To insist of the exclusivity of 
metaphysics m1 would correspond to a form of physicalism or materialism and thus the elimination of 
theology t1. This is a form of reductionism, which violates the order of knowledge.  
The laws of experimental science are quite consistent with most theological propositions. It is in the study 
of unique historical events—say, in cosmological or biological evolution—where the conflict between 
science and religion may arise. Religion, as a kind of knowledge, is a synthetic or reducible kind and is 
constituted by several of the autonomous or irreducible kinds of knowledge listed in Table 1.  
Experimental science qua generalization of historical propositions has nothing whatsoever to say 
regarding a particular historical proposition that is not in the class of historical propositions that gave rise 
to the particular generalization. In other words, if g1 → (h1, h2 ….., hn), where the parentheses denote a 
class of historical propositions, then one cannot conclude that the particular historical proposition hn+1 is 
not possible owing to the generalization g1 , which is based on the class of historical propositions (h1, h2 
….., hn).  In particular, the results of experimental science cannot be used to disprove the possible 
existence of miracles as unique, historical events. For instance, in 1931 Paul Dirac showed that the 
existence of magnetic monopoles lead to the quantization of electric charge, a very fundamental feature of  
Nature whereby the electric charge of any object, other than quarks which are fractionally charged, is an 
integer multiple of the charge of the electron.16 Blas Cabrera presumably detected the hypothetical 
magnetic monopole.17 So far, however, this remains the only experimental detection and so it may be that 
magnetic monopoles do exist and the event, whatever it was, has not been repeated. Therefore, in the 
order of being, the historicity of the magnetic monopole is on a par with that of a miracle owing to its 
historical uniqueness.  
 
Regulative Character of Metaphysics 
The regulative character of metaphysics for the experimental sciences and the other positive sciences, viz., 
formal logic (FL), mathematics (Math), and history (H), follows from the truth table of logical 
implications, Table 2.  Let the following implications be true for the experimental generalizations {g1, g2, 
..., g20} and (g1, g2, ..., g10)  and the metaphysical propositions {m1, m2}, viz.,  (g1, g2, ..., g10)  →  m1  and   (g11, 
g12, …, g20)  →  m2.  If m1 and m2 are incompatible, say m1 is true and m2 is false, then by Table 2 the set 
(g11, g12, …, g20) is false. Therefore, metaphysics is regulative of the positive sciences. Metaphysics is 
actually partially constitutive of theology, which is a stronger relation than metaphysics being merely 
regulative of theology. Note that the meaning of "regulative" is such that an autonomous kind of 
knowledge A can be constitutive of another autonomous kind of knowledge B if, in fact, A is not 
regulative of B.  Therefore, as one domain of the ontological context, metaphysics is partially constitutive 
of the other domain, theology.  
 
TABLE 2 
Logical Implication* 
 
 
 
*T = true, F = false  
 
 
 
 
Physical Aspect of Nature 
Erwin Schrödinger, founder of quantum mechanics together with Werner Heisenberg, was the forerunner 
in evolutionary biology, genetics, and indeed a great philosopher.18 P. A. M. Dirac remarked that 
Schrödinger's equation underlies "a large part of physics and the whole of chemistry."19 Schrödinger was 
puzzled by the agreement of the existence of a common, real world observed by two different observers. 
"Each person's sense-world is strictly private and not directly accessible to anyone else, this agreement is 
strange, what is especially stranger is how it is established."20 Schrödinger asked, "How do we come to 
know of this general agreement between two private worlds, when they admittedly are private and 
always remain so?"21 Concerning his holistic view of Nature, Schrödinger considers two hypotheses.22 
Schrödinger further indicates, "I have therefore no hesitation in declaring quite bluntly that the 
acceptance of a really existing material world, as the explanation of the fact that we all find in the end that 
we are empirically in the same environment, is mystical and metaphysical."23 Now consciousness is a 
moment-by-moment awareness of our temporal existence and surroundings.  Thus, human knowledge 
has access only to snapshots and flashbacks of reality. In Christian theology, God is the being forever 
conscious and thus eternal that does not exist in time. God has no history and so He experiences the 
whole of reality as an eternal "present for Him."24 The metaphysical and mystical nature that Schrödinger 
ascribes to different spheres of consciousness that recognize that we all live in the same world can 
partially be demystified if one considers the objective nature of scientific data that is collected with the 
aid of purely physical devices. Of course, the metaphysical and mystical nature of consciousness, 
rationality and even life itself remains.  
 
p q p → q 
T T T 
T F F 
F T T 
F F T 
C. S. Lewis seeks answers to the same fundamental questions regarding the acquisition of knowledge by 
humans.  In the process of studying the notion of miracles, their possible occurrence, and their 
supernatural nature, Lewis makes a detailed analysis of what Nature is and what is the nature of human 
rationality and morality.  "If our argument has been sound, rational thought or Reason is not interlocked 
with the great interlocking system of irrational events which we call Nature."25 In particular, "Hence 
every theory of the universe which makes the human mind a result of irrational causes is inadmissible, 
for it would be a proof that there are no such things as proofs. Which is nonsense."26 The laws of Nature 
govern the physical aspect of Nature and thus possess no elements of free will or rationality. It is in this 
sense, that the behavior of Nature is understood by Lewis to be irrational.  Of course, there may be 
intelligence behind the workings of Nature, as in the Christian faith where God not only created the 
whole of reality but He also sustains the creation moment-by-moment into a continuous state of 
existence.  
It interesting that Schrödinger posits the need of the metaphysical and the mystical, whereas Lewis 
considers rationality as necessary elements to understand natural, spatiotemporal events. These are 
actually the assumptions of comprehensibility and objectivation considered by Schrödinger.27 Lewis 
further indicates human reason and morality as proofs of the supernatural.28  
One can then surmise that conscious, rational humans develop the theories of the workings of the 
physical aspect of Nature. However, human rationality is not present in the physical but forms part of the 
nonphysical aspect of humans--self, consciousness, and rationality--that set up experiments and develop 
theories of the physical aspect of reality. It is inherently the differing theological presuppositions of 
Schrödinger and of Lewis that the higher order ontological inferences of Schrödinger ends with the 
Upanishads and that of Lewis with the Bible. In particular, "why our perceiving and thinking self is 
nowhere to be found within the world-picture: because it itself is this world-picture."29 Schrödinger does 
not ascribe individuality or distinctness to self whereas Lewis does.30   
The fundamental question in science, and for that matter, rational thinking in general, is how to decide 
between differing available models or hypotheses in order to account for the existing data. Of course, one 
has to be rather clear on what data is being considered and how the data is collected in that particular 
kind of knowledge. One best way to avoid confusion is to characterize a kind of knowledge according to 
a subject matter as Martin does.3 The question is how one does that in an unambiguous, operational 
fashion so that it is clear what kind of evidence would be necessary in order to establish the truth or 
falsehood of claims being made. Of course, what prior information is used to analyze such data is crucial. 
In order to keep track of what assumptions are being made in the process of developing scientific theories 
of Nature, one must specify what the data D is that one is taking into account and what prior information 
X one is assuming to analyze the data.31 Of course, the division of what is data and what is prior 
information is a purely logical one. In any case, any additional information beyond that provided by the 
data of the current problem is by definition prior information. Bayesian methods are used whereby the 
mathematical rules of probability provide consistent rules for conducting inferences.31 Einstein32 indicates 
that physical influences can propagate only forward in time (causality). However, logical connections, 
which may or may not correspond to causal physical influences, propagate equally well in either 
direction, viz., "one man's prior probability is another man's posterior probability."33 In Bayes' theorem, 
the logical product, say, HX denotes the proposition that both propositions H and X are true. Therefore, 
in order to know the likely truth of H, viz., the posterior probability P(H|DX), given the data D and prior 
X, one needs not only the sampling distribution P(D|HX) but also the prior probabilities P(D|X) for D 
and P(H|X) for H. All probabilities are necessarily conditional on the prior information X since by Bayes' 
theorem33 P(H|DX) = P(H|X) P(D|HX)/P(D|X).  If parts of X are irrelevant to the problem at hand, then 
such parts of X will cancel out mathematically and so P(H|DX) will not depend on such parts of X and so 
are truly irrelevant in determining the likely truth of H.  It is clear, for instance, that theological 
considerations included in the prior information assumed by Isaac Newton that led to his theory of 
gravitation are irrelevant in relating the data logically to the model or hypothesis. 
Science and Reality 
The term "science" is equivocal since it can mean, (a) the method of arriving at generalization of historical 
propositions that constitute G, (b) the mass of information, accrued by such methods, and (c) the theories 
developed to summarize the data into laws of Nature. In addition, one needs to distinguish between the 
experimental sciences from the observational sciences, say astronomy, paleontology, etc., and the 
historical sciences, say forensic science, cosmology, evolution of life on Earth, etc.  Here the term "science" 
is defined by its subject matter, viz., the physical aspect of the whole of reality.11 Thus, "science aims at 
nothing but making true and adequate statements about its object."34 Therefore, the principle of 
objectivation, which together with the principle of understandability of Nature form the basis of the 
scientific method34, is accomplished here by considering the subject matter of science data that can be 
collected, in principle, by purely physical devices thus achieving objectivity.  Therefore, the laws of 
experimental science are generalizations of historical propositions --that is, experimental data--thus all 
physical laws are based on statistics.13 Note that consciousness and rationality are purely nonphysical, 
since purely physical devices cannot detect them. In addition, life cannot be reduced to the purely 
physical, so living beings are both physical and nonphysical. However, despite the difficulty of reducing 
life to the purely physical, it is interesting that Schrödinger considers a genuinely physical--rather than 
nonphysical, not to say, supernatural--law in order to interpret life by the ordinary laws of physics.35 
Schrödinger invokes the 1914 work of Max Planck on dynamic and statistical regularity, which makes a 
fundamental distinction between reversible and irreversible processes, viz., "order-from-order" and 
"order-from-disorder."  Accordingly, Schrödinger's new principle for the understanding of life is nothing 
new to physics but the "order-from-order," which is the same that governs large dynamical systems, say 
the motion of planets or clocks. Of course, it is not at all clear how the "order-from-order" that already 
exists in living beings emerges from the dynamical "order-from-order" governing purely physical 
systems. 
With regard to the notion of "science," an important issue is if a clear demarcation can be made between 
science and nonscience.36 If such a demarcation exists, then the question what science is would have an 
unequivocal answer. It is interesting that many authors use the term "science" but do not quite define it, 
but do refer to the scientific method, "which has a proven track record dating back at least to Francis 
Bacon and which has been embellished by modern philosophers of science, particularly by Karl Popper's 
criterion of falsifiability."37 For instance, Keith Thomson37 mentions, in particular, Ronald L. Numbers, 
Kenneth R. Miller, Alvin Plantinga, Lawrence M. Krauss, and Robert Wuthnow all contributor essayists 
in the Terry Lectures on the religion and science debate who do not define the term "science."37 Thomson 
considers the old Oxford English Dictionary definition of science "in terms of a method of enquiry, 
applied to organized knowledge, leading to the discovery of general laws, and restricted to those 
branches of study that relate to the phenomena of the material universe and their laws."37 Our definition 
of science is based on its subject matter, which is the physical aspect of Nature. 
Despite not providing a clear definition of what is science, Alvin Plantinga claims, "There is a superficial 
conflict but deep concord between science and theistic religion, but superficial concord and deep conflict 
between science and naturalism."38 Plantinga takes naturalism to be the thought that there is no such 
person as God, or anything like God, and so naturalism is a strictly atheistic worldview. Of course, a 
generous description of the whole of reality would span, in the order of complexity, from the purely 
physical to the supernatural.10 These two extreme aspects of reality are bridged by a nonphysical realm, 
which would include elements of life, man, consciousness, rationality, mental and mathematical 
abstractions, etc.  
The demarcation between science and nonscience can be made definite if one adopts the definition of 
science not only as the study of the physical aspect of Nature but with the further proviso that the data 
that makes up the subject matter of science is that which can be obtained, in principle, solely by purely 
physical devices.10  In fact, the term "scientist" was introduced in the nineteenth century when natural 
philosophy became a synonym for physics and science.39   In the words of Schrödinger, "The strange fact 
that on the one hand all our knowledge about the world around us, both that gained in everyday life and 
that revealed by the most carefully planned and painstaking laboratory experiments, rests entirely on 
immediate sense perception, while on the other hand this knowledge fails to reveal the relations of the 
sense perceptions to the outside world, so that in the picture or model we form of the outside world, 
guided by our scientific discoveries, all sensual qualities are absent."40 It is interesting that Democritus of 
Abdera clearly understood this state of affairs already in the fifth century B.C. prior to the advent of the 
sophisticated instrumentations of today.41  
Keith Ward indicates that the definition of science is subject of much debate but enumerates the main 
characteristics of natural science, "data are publicly observable, measurable, repeatable, and agreed on by 
all competent observers."42 He also raises the important question, "Are there any data that are not 
publicly observable, measurable, repeatable, and agreed on by all competent observers?"42 Of course, 
Ward is alluding to experiences in religion, "Overall, it seems that distinctive forms of experience that 
may be termed religious are important to religion and that, without them, religions might not have come 
into existence."43 Clearly the subject matter of science and religion, the physical vs. the nonphysical 
(theology), differ and thus the former can be detected by purely physical devices whereas the latter 
requires humans as "detectors." 
 
Compatibility of Science and Religion 
In his seminal 1989-1991 Gifford Lectures on the place of religion in an age of science, in particular, the 
compatibility of science and religion, Ian Barbour44 sets the stage for the fruitful dialogue between science 
and religion. Barbour deals, amongst many topics, with the success of the methods of science and the 
danger of supposing that science may be the only reliable path to knowledge. In addition, the present 
scientific description of Nature has brought about a radical new view of Nature mainly by the 
counterintuitive views provided by quantum physics and relativity, which can be made to impinge on 
the nature of life and mind. Barbour considers, how all these discoveries affect, in particular, the doctrine 
of human nature and the doctrine of creation? The question of what is reality comes to the fore when 
dealing with these fundamental questions. Barbour develops a "relational and multileveled view of 
reality. In this view, interdependent systems and larger wholes influence the behavior of lower-level 
parts. Such an interpretation provides an alternative to both the classical dualism of spirit and matter (or 
mind and body) and the materialism that often replaced it."45  The whole of reality considered in our 
work is physical/nonphysical/supernatural. 
It is difficult to discuss the question of the compatibility or the conflict between science and religion 
without a clear understanding of the meaning of these terms. Of course, the word "religion" is quite 
equivocal and unless clearly defined will easily lead to all sorts of misunderstandings. The broadness of 
the meaning of the word "religion" can be gauged by the following, "Religion, whether understood in 
broad cultural terms or in more narrow theological categories, reflects a search for meaning and unity, for 
wholeness and relatedness."46  Religion is a synthetic kind of knowledge that includes several 
autonomous kinds of knowledge, for instance, theology (T), history (H), etc. There is no conflict between 
science and theology and so if a conflict or incompatibility exists between science and religion, it is 
between science and some of the autonomous kinds of knowledge that constitutes religion other than 
theology. For instance, the Christian faith is based essentially on the historicity of Jesus of Nazareth, his 
death, and his resurrection. Absent those historical events, there would be no Christian faith. Therefore, 
the Christian faith as a religion has essential historically unique elements in its constitution in addition to 
the theological propositions that underlie the supernatural aspect of the faith. Therefore, there is no 
incompatibility between the Christian faith and the experimental sciences that underlie the laws of 
Nature, which are generalizations of historical propositions and do not apply to unique, historical events.    
Robert Wuthnow observes that, "science and religion come into conflict because neither stays neatly in its 
respective sphere."47 But, what are the natures of the spheres of influence of science and religion? Alvin 
Plantinga indicates, "There is an alleged conflict between the epistemic attitudes of science and religion. 
The scientific attitude, so it is said, involves forming belief on the basis of empirical investigation, holding 
belief tentatively, constantly testing belief, and looking for a better alternative; the religious attitude 
involves believing on faith."48 However, is this a criticism of religion or actually a comment on the 
differing nature of science and religion according to the kinds of knowledge they are as discussed above? 
Barbour finds methodological parallels between science and religion indicating that science is not as 
objective, nor religion as subjective as has been claimed, "Scientific data are theory-laden, not theory-free. 
Theoretical assumptions enter the selection, reporting, and interpretation of what are taken to be data. 
Moreover, theories do not arise from logical analysis of data but from acts of creative imagination in 
which analogies and models often play a role. Conceptual models help us to imagine what is not directly 
observable."49 Barbour further observes, "Many of these same characteristics are present in religion. If the 
data of religion include religious experience, rituals, and scriptural texts, such data are even more heavily 
laden with conceptual interpretations. In religious language, too, metaphors and models are 
prominent."49 Finally, Barbour contrasts the similarities and differences between science and religion, 
"Clearly, religious beliefs are not amenable to strict empirical testing, but they can be approached with 
some of the same spirit of inquiry found in science. The scientific criteria of coherence, 
comprehensiveness, and fruitfulness have their parallels in religious thought."49 The characterization of 
different kinds of knowledge and the data needed to make truth statements helps make sense of the 
whole of reality, viz., physical/nonphysical/supernatural, and allows finding the source of actual and 
apparent incompatibilities between science and religion. 
 
 
Discussion and Conclusion  
 
The kinds of knowledge needed to study and know all that exists are characterized here by their subject 
matter. This allows us to create order and eventually integrate all the different kinds of knowledge 
needed to know truly the real existing things.  The question, what the whole of reality is and how do we 
obtain data for it is addressed within the context of the Christian worldview that considers a human 
being as body, mind, and spirit (soul), which is consistent with Cartesian ontology of only three elements: 
matter, mind, and God. This indicates what the whole of realty is and how do we obtain data for it. The 
unequivocal definition of science, as the study of the physical aspect of reality, strictly defines the actual 
subject matter of physics. However, reductionists use such a definition to suppose that science 
encompasses the whole of reality and is the only means of knowing. Clearly, we do not adhere to 
physicalism since purely physical devices, which in principle collect the data of the physical aspect of 
Nature, do not detect the aspects of humans that are actually nonphysical. Note that reductionists 
consider nonphysical aspects of humans as actually emerging and explicable from the purely physical. 
Therefore, the study of humans that goes beyond the physical aspect and ventures into the 
nonphysical/supernatural is tricky, owing to the difficulty of obtaining unambiguous and consistent 
data.  Note that in biology, psychology, sociology, neuroscience, economics, etc., one is relying more and 
more on a quantifiable description of humans, this is tantamount to emphasizing the physical over the 
more important nonphysical aspects of humans. The Bible deals with humans in historical contexts, 
which are not amenable to generalizations into scientific laws. In fact, the importance of the Bible is the 
truth it provides of the nonphysical/supernatural aspects of humans.  Therefore, knowledge of the 
physical aspect of Nature tells us nothing of the true nature of humans and, least of all, of the nature of 
God. 
Schrödinger's scientific metaphysics, viz., the hypothesis of comprehensibility and objectivation, is 
compatible with the metaphysics implied by theology. The metaphysics underlying science does not 
regulate all means of knowing and so there can be no conflict between science and theology.  In fact, the 
subject matter of science and the content of the Bible overlap only in the physical aspect of Nature, since 
Nature itself is a physical/nonphysical/supernatural entity owing to the existence of humans.  The Bible 
deals with ontological, rather than experimental issues since science deals with the phenomenological 
context and theology and metaphysics constitute the two domains of the ontological context of the whole 
of reality. Therefore, only apparent incompatibilities can arise between the experimental sciences and 
theology with regard to the physical aspect of reality. Herein lies the only possible source of a conflict 
between the generalization in the experimental sciences and theology. Of course, with regard to the 
conflict between science and religion, the synthetic nature of religion as a kind of knowledge augments 
the possible areas of conflict considerably and it is hoped that the work presented here helps identify and 
clarify such areas where incompatibilities may arise. 
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